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We study the problem of a Legislator designing immunity for privately informed cooperating accomplices. Our 
objective is to highlight the positive (vertical) externality between expected returns from crime and the information 
rent that must be granted by the Legislator to whistleblowers in order to break their code of silence (omertà) and 
elicit truthful information revelation. We identify the accomplices' incentives to release distorted information and 
characterize the second-best policy limiting this behavior. The central finding is that this externality leads to a 
second-best policy that purposefully allows whistleblowers not to disclose part of their private information. We 
also show that accomplices must fulfill minimal information requirements to be admitted into the program 
(rationing), that a bonus must be awarded to accomplices providing more reliable information and that, under 
some conditions, rewarding a self-reporting `boss' can increase efficiency. These results are consistent with a 
number of widespread legislative provisions. 
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Organized crime is a threat to citizens, businesses, state institutions, as well as the economy as a
whole. Successful prosecution of criminal organizations often requires to draw upon the uncorrob-
orated evidence provided by cooperating accomplices (whistleblowers). The reason being that the
most culpable and dangerous individuals rarely do the ￿ dirty job￿￿ see, e.g., Je⁄ries and Gleeson
(1995). Even if these people are ultimately responsible for the crimes committed by their ￿ soldiers￿ ,
they hardly get convicted because they mainly deal through intermediaries and push their own par-
ticipation up to behind-the-scenes control and guidance. To face this di¢ culty many countries have
introduced innovative legal rules (leniency programs) facilitating the use of insider information in
criminal proceedings.
Allowing for uncorroborated testimonies is viewed as a crucial advantage in the prosecution of
organized crime. Insider information can provide a richly detailed context to a case ￿ e.g., that
members of a criminal organization met at a particular location and that the witness was in a position
to know about the types of criminal acts at issue ￿ that can help making the public proceeding
against a defendant compelling. However, accomplices cooperate only when they perceive that there
will be adequate legal bene￿ts to be gained from the deal, and this form of ￿ horse-trading￿exacerbates
the greater is the risk of intimidation and reprisal by their partners. As explained by Schur (1988),
crime instigators￿most e⁄ective tool against prosecution is murdering whistleblowers. Intimidation
in criminal proceedings has, in fact, pervasive and perverse e⁄ects. The risk of biased and untruthful
testimonies is, for instance, potentially staggering and has often thrown serious doubts on the e¢ cacy of
these programs.1 What are the costs and bene￿ts of leniency in criminal proceedings where accomplices
own insider information that is not perfectly veri￿able? Do these people have the right incentives to
disclose their private information? Is it really necessary to reward them with judicial leniency? Why
do these bene￿ts appear to be excessively generous?
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we identify the forces that lead informants to misbehave
by releasing biased testimonies. Second, we characterize the instruments that the Legislator can use
to limit such behavior. Our main conclusion is that the interplay between insider information and the
risk of witness intimidation leads to a second-best policy that purposefully allows whistleblowers to
hide part of their private information, but that at the same time imposes admission requirements into
the program that are more demanding than the ￿rst-best.
To make this point, we study the optimal design of a leniency program in a simple game involving
a hierarchical criminal organization and a Legislator. The criminal organization is formed by two
mobsters: a principal (boss) and an agent (fellow), each with speci￿c skills. The boss plans the crime
and delegates its execution to the fellow. After the crime has been committed, some evidence about the
1There is much controversy concerning accomplice witnesses both on the e¢ ciency and fairness grounds. In Germany,
for instance, as underlined by Huber (2001), arguments against the use of accomplice witnesses are based on: ￿The
principle of equal treatment and principles of proportionality and legality...Additionally, there have been doubts expressed
about the level of truthfulness in the testimony of accomplice witnesses.￿ Other countries, like those of Anglo-Saxon
tradition, mainly underline the necessary role played by cooperating accomplices in criminal justice, especially when a
state of emergency is justi￿ed because of organized crime.
2boss and his involvement into the crime materializes, this evidence is observed only by the criminals
but neither by prosecutors nor by the jury ruling the trial. The crime triggers an investigation and,
at this stage, the agent can opt to whistle. The prize for cooperation entails an amnesty announced
by the Legislator at the outset of the game. Moreover, the Legislator can also enforce restrictions
on the selection process regulating the program￿ s admission policy ￿ i.e., only accomplices whose
information satis￿es minimal standards are eligible for the program.
In this set-up, we ￿rst emphasize the costs and bene￿ts of leniency and then characterize the
second-best policy shaped by these forces. We show that, as long as the relationship between the
Legislator and the informants is plagued by asymmetric information, there is a positive (vertical)
externality between the need to grant rents to whistleblowers in order to elicit truthful information
and the monetary return from crime ￿ owing to the boss. The point is that more precise and reliable
testimonies (presumably) imply a higher conviction probability for the boss, whose intimidation and
retaliation ability weakens when convicted and jailed. Hence, in the states of nature where the evidence
that can be gathered against the boss is quite reliable regardless of whether the agent testi￿es, an
accomplice might pro￿t from hiding part of his private information. That is, pretending to face a
high risk of reprisal, allows accomplices to ask for amnesties that are more lenient than what would
be necessary. In equilibrium, this possibility generates an ex-post information rent for the agent that
sti￿ es the reservation wage he needs to be o⁄ered in order to accept the illegal deal. And, from
an ex-ante perspective, the emergence of this rent spurs the boss￿net gain from the crime to the
detriment of society. We show that this externality is the main source of a marked di⁄erence between
the second- and ￿rst-best policies. Under complete information the accomplice cannot distort the
testimony because his information is the same as that available to the prosecutors (or to the jury
ruling the trial). The ￿rst-best policy is then chosen so as to make the accomplice indi⁄erent between
talking and facing the trial, and it entails no entry restrictions to the program. By contrast, under
asymmetric information, the second-best policy must award better deals to those who provide more
productive information. Moreover, in order to minimize the rent that privately informed accomplices
can grab, the Legislator is forced to restrict the access to the program (rationing) and to require
distorted testimonies (partial disclosure).
Interestingly, the second-best policy entails an excessively generous amnesty relative to the e¢ cient
rule: in order to elicit truthful information, a bonus must be awarded to those accomplices that reveal
￿ good quality￿information. Similarly, although it is always convenient to draw upon accomplices￿
testimonies to ￿ght organized crime, rationing the access to the program is necessary insofar as it has
a negative e⁄ect on the boss￿ s expected pro￿t and thus reduces the crime rate. This rationing rule
can be implemented by means of a simple protocol: there exists an optimal information ￿oor below
which agents are sent to trial ￿ i.e., their application to the program is rejected when they cannot
deliver testimonies that meet the standard. Essentially, reducing the set of contingencies in which an
accomplice can access the program sti￿ es the uncertainty faced by the Legislator when announcing
the policy, whereby making mimicking less pro￿table. Once again, this e⁄ect is welfare enhancing
because lower information rents for the informant shift onto higher break-even wages and thus imply
3higher (employment) costs for the boss.
Finally, we extend the analysis to the case where the bene￿t of an amnesty can also be awarded to
a self-reporting boss. We show that, when the agent￿ s information is very productive, allowing the boss
to whistle and cheat his organization may enhance e¢ ciency, because it allows to save on the agent￿ s
information rent. More precisely, under the assumption that the whole organization is convicted with
certainty when the boss self-reports, a domino e⁄ect in the spirit of Baccara and Baar-Isaac (2008)
emerges. This e⁄ect reduces the set of contingencies where the agent whistles, hence it allows to
reduce his rents, which are higher precisely in the states where testimonies are more productive. As a
consequence, the second-best policy with self-reporting features a less selective admission policy and
a lower distortion on the optimal disclosure. Of course, it is never optimal to let the boss talk in all
contingencies and/or grant him a too lenient discount because this would have an adverse e⁄ect on
deterrence by increasing (ceteris paribus) his return from the crime.
Our ￿ndings are consistent with a number of legal provisions characterizing accomplice-witnesses
regulations across the world, and show that the bene￿ts of those programs in terms of reduced crime
may justify, at least from an e¢ ciency point of view, the risk of biased testimonies and the recognition
of pronounced legal bene￿ts to cooperating accomplices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 links our contribution to the existing
literature. In Section 3 we set up the baseline model and determine ￿rst the e¢ cient policy, then the
characterization of the second-best policy. Section 4 extends the baseline model to the case where the
bene￿t of an amnesty is also awarded to a self-reporting boss. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in
the Appendix.
2. Related Literature
Our analysis is related to the literature on organized crime. Traditionally, this literature has stressed
welfare comparisons between monopoly and competitive supply of bads ￿ see, e.g., Buchanan (1973)
and Backhaus (1979) ￿ while more recently Jennings (1984), Polo (1995), Konrad and Skaperdas
(1994, 1997) and Garoupa (2000) started to model criminal organizations as vertical structures where
the principal has the necessity to control and discipline its members.2 But, these models have over-
looked the role of accomplice-witnesses programs as a tool to generate con￿ ict within criminal organi-
zations, which is instead the starting point of our analysis. Ko⁄man and Lawarree (1996) o⁄er a ￿rst
model where collusion in a hierarchy can be prevented by leniency. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006)
show that a moderate form of leniency can have the counterproductive e⁄ect of facilitating occasional
illegal transactions. Di⁄erently from us, in Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) criminal organizations are
not modeled as vertical structures and reported evidence is not a byproduct of the crime but it is
collected by criminals to be used as a threat to strengthen the sustainability of the organization itself.
Our paper is also linked to Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008): they analyze the link between the optimal
design of criminal organizations and the information ￿ ow di⁄used through their hierarchies, by con-
2See also Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995), Kugler, Verdier and Zenou (2005) and Mansour et al. (2006).
4sidering both vertical and horizontal structures. We focus only on the former type of organizations,
but explore the link between leniency programs and insider information, an issue that is not addressed
in their set-up. Hence, in this respect our models are complements. Recently, Acconcia et al. (2009)
have developed a simple model of hierarchical criminal organizations where the Legislator grants legal
bene￿ts to low-rank criminals who decide to cooperate with the justice. By using data collected for
Italy, they also argue that the Italian accomplice-witness program introduced in 1991 did a⁄ect in a
signi￿cative manner organized crime in those regions where the ma￿as have been historically more
pervasive. More speci￿cally, they identify the positive e⁄ect of the policy on prosecution and argue
that it also strengthened deterrence.3 Our analysis is motivated by this evidence and it extends the
theoretical framework developed in Acconcia et al. (2009) in three main directions. First, in contrast
to them, we consider an adverse selection setting where the accomplice￿ s information is non-veri￿able.
Second, we enlarge the Legislator￿ s set of instruments to include, besides the amnesty rate, an in-
formation ￿ oor below which an agent￿ s testimony is not accepted. Third, to widen the scope of our
conclusions, we also consider the possibility of awarding an amnesty to a self-reporting boss and show
that this is sometimes necessary to ￿ght organized crime. In this respect, our work also relates to the
￿ self-reporting￿literature. In Kaplow and Shavell (1994), for instance, self-reporting saves enforcement
resources because individuals who report their harmful acts need not be detected, and it reduces risk
because individuals who report their behavior bear certain rather than uncertain sanctions. In our
model, instead, the welfare enhancing e⁄ect of self-reporting stems from the hierarchical nature of
criminal organizations, and it becomes more relevant the more severe is the adverse selection problem
between the Legislator and the cooperating accomplices.
Of course, our analysis relates, and builds upon the antitrust law enforcement literature, which
begun with the pioneering paper of Motta and Polo (2003) and studies the e⁄ects of leniency programs
on cartel formation in oligopolistic markets.4 Here we will focus on the papers that elaborate on the
role of information. Feess and Walz (2004) ￿nd that a more informed party that self reports providing
more information should receive more generous bene￿ts than a less informed party and use their
￿ndings to compare leniency programs in the US and the EU. Silbye (2010), Sauvagnat (2010) and
Harrington (2011) all allow for some form of private information on the probability of conviction when
no ￿rm has applied for leniency. Speci￿cally, while in Harrington (2011) each cartel member has private
information on the likelihood that the authority will be able to convict them without a cooperating
￿rm. Instead, Silbye (2010) assumes that the probability of conviction is common knowledge but each
￿rm possesses evidence that it could submit to convict the other ￿rm if it applied for leniency. Finally,
Sauvagnat (2010) studies an informed principal problem since the authority has private information
about the strength of its case and decides strategically whether to open an investigation or not. In
contrast to them we take a mechanism design approach to leniency, where in order to minimize the
rent that privately informed accomplices can grab, the Legislator restricts the access to the program
3Similar evidence for antitrust cases is presented in Miller (2009).
4Besides Motta and Polo (2003) see also Rey (2003), Spagnolo (2003), Aubert et al. (2006), Chen and Harrington
(2007), Chen and Rey (2007) and Harrington (2008).
5(rationing) and requires distorted testimonies (partial disclosure).
The literature on plea bargaining also shares common features with our paper. In these models the
prosecutor that is concerned with achieving the greatest possible punishment, uses plea bargaining
as a means to save scarce resources by avoiding taking all defendants to trial (Landes, 1971). More
recently, Kobayashi (1992) interprets plea bargaining as a device through which a prosecutor ￿buys
information￿ . See also the recent survey by Gazal-Ayal and Riza (2009). However, all these papers
do not establish a link between internal cohesion of cartels and rewards, which is more speci￿c to
criminal organizations.
3. The Baseline Model
The criminal organization: Consider a game where a benevolent Legislator and two members of a
criminal organization, the principal (boss) and his agent (fellow), interact sequentially. The Legislator,
having forbidden welfare reducing criminal acts, designs an accomplice-witnesses program. Each
member of the criminal organization owns speci￿c skills: the boss plans the crime and delegates its
execution to the fellow who materially commits the illegal act.
The crime yields a monetary return ￿ which is stochastic and distributes over the compact support
￿ ￿ [0;￿] according to the cumulative distribution function (cdf) G(￿). The boss hires the fellow
after having observed the realization of the crime return ￿, he has full bargaining power and proposes
a wage w to the agent. If accepted, the wage is paid after the crime is committed. If the agent refuses
the o⁄er, the game ends and both parties get a reservation utility u. Committing the crime triggers
an investigation with probability ￿. We normalize u = 0 and ￿ = 1 with no loss of generality.
Information: After the crime has been committed and the wage w has been paid, some evidence about
the boss and his involvement into the crime materializes. As we shall explain below, this evidence can
be used against the boss and therefore a⁄ects the outcome of the investigative and judicial process.
It is modeled as the realization of a random variable ~ ￿ which distributes over the compact support
￿ ￿ [0;￿] according to the twice continuously di⁄erentiable and atomless cdf F(￿), with density f(￿).
As a convention, we assume that larger values of ￿ re￿ ect better and more reliable evidence ￿ i.e.,
higher values of ￿ mean that more evidence against the boss can be gathered by the judicial authority
and brought at trial.
Judicial system and legal regimes: There are two legal regimes:
￿ No leniency: Under this regime, when prosecuted, the agent is sent to trial. He is convicted
and bears a sanction Sa with probability p. The principal is convicted and bears the sanction
Sp with probability q (￿), where _ q (￿) ￿ 0.
The impact of ￿ on q (:) can be interpreted as the outcome of the prosecutor￿ s investigative activity
(e.g., shadowing the agent or tapping his phone) that maps the potentially available evidence, as
6measured by ￿, onto the trial￿ s (stochastic) outcome.5 In other words, one can think of the probability
of conviction q (:) as resulting from the interaction of the portion of evidence that the prosecutor is
able to gather given the available ￿ traces￿ , together with the preferences of judges and jury.
￿ Leniency: When a leniency program is in place, the agent can decide to whistle and cooperate
with the justice. If so, he enjoys an amnesty ￿(s) in exchange of a testimony s which, together
with the state of nature ￿, determines the probability Q(s;￿) ￿ q (￿) of convicting the boss.
The interpretation of Q(s;￿) is as follows: while better (available) evidence ￿ i.e., a higher ￿ ￿
helps the prosecutor￿ s investigative and proof-making activity, the testimony s delivers a public signal
to the jury ruling the trial, whereby providing additional uncorroborated evidence that a⁄ects the
trial￿ s outcome.6,7
Direct revelation mechanism: There is no loss of generality in invoking the Revelation Principle in this
framework (see, e.g., La⁄ont and Martimort, 2002). Hence, we restrict attention to direct mechanisms:






an amnesty ￿(:), with ￿ : ￿ ! <, and a testimony s(:), with s : ￿ ! ￿, both contingent on the
agent￿ s report ^ ￿, which is interpreted as a private signal sent by the whistleblower to the prosecutor.8
Essentially, cooperation is rewarded with a reduction ￿(^ ￿) of the sanction Sa, but requires a public
testimony s(^ ￿) for every report ^ ￿.
In addition to the (direct) revelation mechanism, we also allow the Legislator to commit to an
information ￿ oor ￿: below this threshold a testimony is not accepted. Clearly, if ￿ > ￿ the program is
shut down and agents are always sent to trial.
Intimidation risk and retaliation: Criminal organizations seek to punish disloyalty and, when they
succeed in doing so, a loss R > 0 is in￿ icted to whistleblowers. We normalize R to 1 without loss
of generality9 and assume that this loss materializes only if the boss is acquitted, which occurs with
5While the prosecutor￿ s investigative activity is able to uncover some of the mobsters private information and more
so the larger is ￿ ( _ q (￿) ￿ 0), at the same time the result of the trail remains uncertain. This is because the verdict
depends not only on the available evidence but also on the preferences of judges and jury which are uncertain.
6The use of uncorroborated testimonies is an accepted instrument which helps convicting the heads of criminal
organizations. In the U.S. federal courts defendants can be convicted solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony
of the accomplices and also in Italy, the minimum requirements of evidence are lower in cases in which the defendant is
accused of organized crime.
7The jury is a body of citizens and public o¢ cials summoned by law and sworn to hear and deliver a verdict upon a
case presented in court. The prosecutor is the public o¢ cial that institutes and conducts the legal proceedings against
criminals. The ￿nal outcome of a trial is usually determined by the interaction of these independent parties, which we
do not model here for the sake of simplicity.
8As explained in Cassidy (2004), the prosecutor is the public o¢ cial in charge of proposing and motivating to the
jury leniency for the whistleblower with whom he interacts.
9The historical evidence o⁄ers ample support to the idea that retaliation is an important source of deterrence for
whistleblowers. Many accomplices in Italy have been murdered after their testimony in a ma￿a trial. The ￿rst member
of the Sicilian ma￿a that publicly acknowledged its existence, Leonardo Vitale, was murdered after his testimony. He
walked into a Palermo police station on the evening of March 29, 1973, and declared that he was a member of the Ma￿a
and confessed to various acts of extortion, arson and two homicides. In front of dumbfounded police o¢ cers he explained
how a Ma￿a family is organised and revealed the existence of the Ma￿a Commission, long before the pentito Tommaso
7probability 1 ￿ Q(s;￿) in the state ￿ given the testimony s. This is with no loss of insights under the
hypothesis that the retaliation ability of the boss weakens once he is convicted and jailed.
Timing: The timing of the game is as follows:
t=0 The Legislator decides whether to launch a leniency program and accordingly commits to a
policy }=(L;￿) that entails the mechanism L and the ￿ access￿￿ oor ￿.
t=1 Uncertainty about ￿ resolves and the boss decides whether to commit the crime. If so, he o⁄ers
the wage w to the agent. If the o⁄er is rejected the game ends. Otherwise, once the illegal act
is committed, the wage w is paid and the game proceeds to the next stage.
t=2 A realization of ~ ￿ materializes and only the criminals learn it.10
t=3 The investigation opens. If the leniency program is in place, the agent decides whether to whistle.
If so, he sends a private message ^ ￿ to the prosecutor who then grants him an amnesty ￿(^ ￿) in
exchange of a testimony s(^ ￿):
t=4 The trial uncertainty resolves and sanctions (including the retaliation loss) are imposed.
Actions and equilibrium concept: The boss decides whether to commit the crime and makes a wage
o⁄er w to the agent. The agent can accept or reject the o⁄er and, if prosecuted, he also decides
whether to confess and what report to make. The Legislator announces a policy }. The solution
concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
Technical assumptions: The analysis will be conducted under the following assumptions.
A1 The probability function Q(s;￿) is continuous and twice continuously di⁄erentiable. It is in-
creasing and concave in ￿, single peaked with respect to s and satis￿es: Qs (s;￿) = 0 for s = ￿,
Q(s;￿) > Q(0;￿) ￿ q (￿) for all ￿ and s > 0. Moreover, it also features increasing di⁄erences in
￿ and s ￿ i.e., Qs￿ (:) > 0 for all (￿;s).11
Assuming that Q(:) is single peaked and has a unique maximum at s = ￿ implies that the closer
is the informant￿ s testimony to the true state of nature ￿ i.e., the more precise is this testimony ￿
the stronger is its e⁄ect on the boss￿prosecution risk. Essentially, neither under-reporting nor making
up false information can improve the probability of convicting the boss.
Buscetta exposed Ma￿a secrets to judges who were prepared to listen. According to judge Giovanni Falcone the Ma￿a
understood the importance of Vitale￿ s revelations much better than the Italian justice system at the time and killed him
when the time was most opportune ￿ see, e.g., Falcone (1991).
10This hypothesis captures the idea that cooperation between mobsters generates information. Only after interacting
with the boss and executing its orders, the agent is able to learn some relevant information that, once released to
prosecutors, can harm the crime instigator at the judicial stage.




￿, with ￿ > 0and ￿ > 0, satis￿es all these
requirements.
8Complementarity ￿ i.e., Qs￿ (:) > 0 ￿ re￿ ects the idea that the marginal impact of a better
testimony on the probability of convicting the boss is stronger in states of nature where the available
evidence is better ￿ i.e., given s0 > s the di⁄erence Q(s0;￿) ￿ Q(s;￿) is increasing in ￿:





Qs￿ (x;￿)dx > 0 8￿ 2 ￿.
The interpretation of this hypothesis is that more precise testimonies are relatively of little help when
the evidence corroborating and supporting the informant￿ s assertions is poor.12




1 ￿ F (￿)
f (￿)
￿
￿ 0 8￿ 2 ￿:
This is a standard assumption in the screening literature. Moreover, to focus on separating equi-
libria it will be convenient to impose the following additional technical assumptions:
A3 Qs￿￿ (:) ￿ 0 and Qss￿ (:) ￿ 0 for all s and ￿.
We shall restrict attention to the class of continuous and almost everywhere di⁄erentiable mecha-
nisms. As a tie-breaking condition we assume that whenever indi⁄erent between joining the program
and facing the trial, the agent whistles. All players are risk neutral. Moreover, following the literature,
all sanctions will be interpreted as the monetary equivalent of the imprisonment terms, ￿nes, damages,
and so forth, to which the criminals expose themselves.
Social goal: For simplicity, we assume that the Legislator￿ s objective is to minimize crimes.13 Given
the policy }, let C (}) and w(}) denote the boss￿expected sanction and the agent￿ s break-even wage,
respectively. Then committing the crime yields a non negative expected utility to the boss if and only
if the return ￿ exceeds the (total) expected costs ￿ i.e.,
￿ ￿ C (}) + w(}) ￿ ￿ (}):
Hence, the Legislator￿ s optimal policy } will be chosen so as to minimize the (expected) crime rate
W(}) = 1 ￿ Pr(￿ ￿ ￿ (})); (3.1)
12The case of Leonardo Vitale is again emblematic to explain this point. Already in 1973 Vitale started to cooperate
with the justice by indicating the names of many ma￿osi and the roots of their main tra¢ cs, he also explained how a
Ma￿a family is organized and revealed the existence of the Ma￿a Commission. In spite of this testimony, the evidence
surrounding the trial that was opened on the basis of the mere Vitale￿ s assertions was so tiny that all defendants were in
the end acquitted. As pointed out by judge Falcone, this testimony turned out to be very important for the subsequent
￿ghts against organized crime in Italy, that is, when more evidence, gathered by Falcone and his investigative group,
supported the testimonies of Vitale and the subsequent whistleblowers.
13Introducing trial and/or information gathering costs does not add new interesting trade-o⁄s to our analysis. Hence,
merely for the sake of crispiness, we rule them out.
9subject to the relevant incentive and participation constraints.
3.1. First-best Policy
In this section we develop the benchmark where the realization of ~ ￿ is common knowledge. Let
u(￿) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿(￿))Sa ￿ (1 ￿ Q(s(￿);￿));
be the utility of a type-￿ agent who enters the program: he delivers a testimonies s(￿), enjoys an
amnesty ￿(￿) and bears the retaliation loss R = 1 with probability 1￿Q(s(￿);￿) ￿ i.e., in the event
that the boss is acquitted. Moreover, let u0 = ￿pSa be the expected utility that the agent obtains
when facing the trial: a sanction Sa is imposed with probability p in this case.
Clearly, in each state ￿ where the agent can apply to the program ￿ i.e., if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ the Legislator
chooses the amnesty rate ￿(￿) and a testimony s(￿), so as to equalize u(￿) and u0 ￿ i.e.,
(1 ￿ ￿(￿))Sa + 1 ￿ Q(s(￿);￿) = pSa: (3.2)
For any policy } such that (3.2), the boss commits the crime if and only if the revenue ￿ exceeds
his expected costs ￿ i.e., ￿ ￿ C (}) + w(}) ￿ ￿ (}) ￿ where the boss￿expected sanction C (}) is:
C (}) = Sp
Z ￿
0











u(￿)dF (￿) = 0 =) w(}) = pSa 8￿: (3.4)
Hence:
￿ (}) ￿ pSa + Sp
Z ￿
0




The Legislator￿ s optimization program is then:
max
}










whose solution determines the ￿rst-best policy described below:
Proposition 1. Assume A1. The ￿rst-best policy }fb has the following properties:
￿ (No rationing) A whistleblower is always admitted into the program: ￿fb = 0.
￿ (Full disclosure) In every state there is full disclosure of information: sfb (￿) = ￿ for each ￿.
￿ (Zero-rent) There are no rents left to the whistleblower: ufb (￿) = u0 for each ￿.
10Under complete information there is no reason to distort the agent￿ s testimony: he fully reveals
his private information in court. Moreover, it will be e¢ cient not to ration the access to the program
because the agent￿ s information is always productive ￿ i.e., Q(￿;￿) > q (￿) for all ￿ > 0.
3.2. Second-best Policy
We now turn to analyze the case where the realized state of nature ￿ is private information. In this
scenario the game is one of imperfect information and the privately informed agent can gain from
mimicking. More precisely, depending on the shape of the mechanism L, in state ￿ the whistleblower
might gain from providing an untruthful report ^ ￿ in order to enjoy a lighter sanction. These mimicking
opportunities force the Legislator to distort the optimal policy for rent extraction reasons.
To characterize the incentive feasible allocations, let
u(^ ￿;￿) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿(^ ￿))Sa ￿ (1 ￿ Q(s(^ ￿);￿));
be the agent￿ s utility in state ￿ given his report ^ ￿. An incentive feasible allocation must induce truthful
information revelation by those agents that are admitted into the program and, if the ￿ oor ￿ exceeds
the lower-bound 0, it must also be such that rationed accomplices do not ￿nd it pro￿table to lie in
order to join the program.











￿ 0 , _ s(￿)Qs￿(￿;￿) ￿ 0 8￿ ￿ ￿; (3.7)
in addition to the participation constraint:
u(￿) ￿ u0 8￿ ￿ ￿: (3.8)
These conditions ensure that (locally) the cooperating accomplice has no incentive to manipulate
his information and that he prefers to join the program rather than being sent to trial.14 As standard,
an envelope argument allows to rewrite the ￿rst-order incentive compatibility constraint as:
_ u(￿) = Q￿ (s(￿);￿) 8￿ ￿ ￿: (3.9)
Hence, under A1 the information rent u(￿) is increasing ￿ i.e., _ u(￿) > 0. Agents with better
information have an incentive to mimic downward because the risk of retaliation is higher in worst
states of nature ￿ i.e., the probability1 ￿ Q(s(￿);￿) is decreasing in ￿ ￿ and thus they request a
more generous amnesty in exchange of a testimony. This induces the agent to under-report in order
14We shall verify in the Appendix that, when these conditions hold, mimicking is unpro￿table also globally.
11to enjoy lighter (expected) sanctions than it would be necessary from the Legislator￿ s point of view.
Integrating equation (3.9) we have:
u(￿) = u(￿) +
Z ￿
￿
Q￿ (s(x);x)dx 8￿ ￿ ￿: (3.10)
An important point to note is that the rent increases with the testimony s(x). A more precise
testimony ampli￿es the incentive to mimic downward for the same reasons of an higher ￿: Moreover,
a tighter information ￿ oor ￿ i.e., a larger ￿ ￿ also sti￿ es the information rent: when the access to
the program is rationed there are fewer mimicking possibilities.




u(^ ￿;￿) 8￿ < ￿; (3.11)
that is, rationed types must prefer facing the trial rather than mimicking those who can access the
program.
We can now turn to solve the boss￿and Legislator￿ s optimization problems. As before, the crime
is committed if and only if its return exceeds the expected cost￿ i.e., if
￿ ￿ ￿ (}) ￿
Z ￿
0
(q (￿)Sp ￿ u0)dF (￿) +
Z ￿
￿
(Q(s(￿);￿)Sp ￿ u(￿))dF (￿):






Pr(￿ ￿ ￿ (}))
s.t.,
(3.7), (3.8), (3.10), (3.11).
Neglecting the second-order local incentive constraint (3.7) and the rationing constraint (3.11), which









Q(s(￿);￿)Sp ￿ u0 ￿ Q￿ (s(￿);￿)






What are the trade-o⁄s at stake when the inability to verify the agent￿ s insider information creates
scope for manipulation? How does the second-best policy change with respect to the ￿rst-best? The
key di⁄erence between the cases of complete and asymmetric information rests upon a simple idea. In
order to elicit truthful information revelation the Legislator needs to give up an information rent to a
whistleblower and this rent generates a positive externality on the boss￿expected pro￿t: rents granted
by the Legislator ex post, translate onto lower wages that the boss has to pay to the agent ex ante,
thus making the crime more pro￿table (other things being kept equal). By the same token, limiting
the subset of types eligible for the program ￿ i.e., a tighter ￿ oor ￿ ￿ also sti￿ es the boss￿crime
12return. This restriction, however, comes at a cost: excluding agents from the program generates a
positive externalities on the boss￿ s expected utility as long as the information of these excluded types
is very productive ￿ i.e., if the di⁄erence Q(s(￿);￿) ￿ q (￿) is not negligible.
The next proposition shows that, taken together, these e⁄ects force the Legislator to: (i) distort
the testimony required to whistleblowers, and (ii) ration the access to the program in the attempt to
minimize the information rent and its positive externality on the boss￿ s expected pro￿t.
Proposition 2. Assume A1-A3. The second-best policy }sb has the following properties:
￿ (Rationing) There exists a lower bound ￿sb > 0 such that all types ￿ above ￿sb are admitted
into the program and prefer to talk in equilibrium, all types below ￿sb prefer to opt-out and face
the trial. The bound ￿sb is determined by the following condition:




￿ (Partial disclosure) All agents admitted into the program provide a downward distorted




Qs￿(ssb(￿);￿) = 0; (3.13)
with _ ssb(￿) > 0.
￿ (Excessive amnesty) The second-best amnesty ￿sb(￿) is larger than the ￿rst-best for every
￿ ￿ i.e.,
￿sb(￿) = 1 ￿ p + (1 ￿ Q(ssb(￿);￿)
1










> ￿fb (￿); (3.14)
with _ ￿
sb
(￿) < 0 and _ Bsb(￿) > 0:
The second-best policy trades o⁄ the social costs and bene￿ts of a leniency program. The infor-
mation ￿ oor ￿sb is determined so as to account for the rent-e⁄ect that asymmetric information adds
to the entry process into the program. A smaller support of types admitted into the program ￿ i.e.,
a higher ￿sb ￿ sti￿ es the agent￿ s mimicking possibilities, whereby reducing his ex post information
rent. This rent-reduction e⁄ect due to rationing translates onto the boss￿expected utility: lower ex
post rents for the agent imply higher expected wages and thus higher costs for the boss. On the other
side, however, a smaller support of types also sti￿ es the boss￿risk of prosecution whereby reducing his
expected pro￿ts. On the balance, the second-best policy calls for stricter eligibility criteria relative
to the ￿rst-best one. Interestingly, by creating less con￿ ict between the boss and the agent, stricter
eligibility criteria increase the wage that the former has to pay to the latter, whereby sti￿ ing the
13equilibrium crime rate. The same type of intuition also explains why the second-best policy does
not feature full disclosure: to limit mimicking opportunities, and the implied information rents, the
Legislator is forced to require downward distorted testimonies.
Finally, note that the amnesty rate will be set so as to satisfy the local incentive compatibility
constraint (3.6) and to make the marginal type ￿sb indi⁄erent between talking or facing the trial.
This leads to a second-best amnesty that, besides the zero utility level characterizing the complete
information benchmark, also grants a bonus increasing with the quality of information provided by
the agent ￿ i.e., increasing in ￿. Overall, however, the second-best amnesty is decreasing in ￿ because
a cooperating accomplice with worse information faces a higher likelihood of retaliation and need to
get compensated for such extra risk.
4. Self-reporting by the Boss
Up to now, we have considered a policy that grants an amnesty only to the agent. What would happen
if this bene￿t is extended to a self-reporting boss as well? Would such a policy be optimal?
The historical evidence shows that, occasionally, even leaders of criminal organizations decide to
cooperate with the justice by cheating their relatives, former allies and ￿ employees￿ .15 In this section
we modify the baseline model to encompass this possibility. The objective is to show that dealing
directly with a self-confessing boss might be necessary to e¢ ciently ￿ght organized crime.
Suppose that the Legislator grants an amnesty, hereafter ￿, to the self-reporting boss as a reward
for his cooperation. The structure of the game is similar to that analyzed before with the following
modi￿cations:
￿ t=0: the Legislator commits to a policy }￿=(L;￿;￿) that, as before, includes the (direct)
mechanism L together with the access ￿ oor ￿, and in addition the discount ￿ granted to the
self-reporting boss.
￿ t=2: after the random variable ~ ￿ has realized, the boss can self-report. If he does so, the
sanction Sp gets reduced by ￿, while the agent is convicted with probability 1.
￿ t=3: the agent can whistle and enters the program if and only if: (i) the boss has not already
self-reported at stage t=2; (ii) his information meets the standard ￿.
We assume that the agent is convicted with certainty when the boss self-reports: the information
provided by a self-confessing boss is more reliable than the agent￿ s imperfect testimony.16 Moreover,
to capture the idea that the boss might be more reluctant to talk than the agent, we denote by ￿ ￿ 0
15For instance, in 1996 Giovanni Brusca, one of the most powerful leaders of the corleonesi family and self-confessed
multiple murderer (e.g., he was convicted for the bombings that killed judges Chinnici and Falcone), started his cooper-
ation with the justice by releasing relevant information that turned out to be crucial for the capture and conviction of
many of his former partners, among which the powerful ￿ Godfather￿Bernardo Provenzano whose hiding lasted for over
forty years.
16While we believe that the boss possess better information than the agent, the assumption that this information leads
to conviction with probability 1 is made only for simplicity.
14the additional cost that he bears when cheating his fellow. This parameter re￿ ects those psychological
costs incurred by a mobster that gives up a ￿ command position￿and reneges his criminal ￿ culture￿ .
Throughout we will make the following additional technical hypothesis:
A4 ￿ is large enough relative to the boss￿expected sanction in the absence of leniency ￿ i.e.,
￿ > q(￿)Sp: (4.1)
Equation (4.1) rules out the uninteresting case where the boss whistle when the agent is not allowed
to talk, which would be at odds with the available historical evidence.17
Before characterizing formally the optimal policy it is worthwhile discussing how the equilibrium
of the game looks like in this new setting. To make the problem interesting, we will focus on equilibria
where, to improve e¢ ciency, the Legislator grants a positive amnesty to the boss. Then, two extra
features characterize the equilibrium strategies under self-reporting. First, since the boss decides to
self-report upon observing the realization of the state of nature ￿, the equilibrium description must
specify the subset of states of nature where this contingency occurs. Second, the ￿ o⁄-equilibrium￿
actions and policy matter to sustain equilibria with self-reporting. To understand this point, suppose
that (in equilibrium) the boss is expected to talk in state ￿, and assume that he deviates by not
talking. Then, what happens in the continuation game following such an unexpected action? What
would the agent do in this contingency?
Under A4 this deviation is unpro￿table if the agent talks in state ￿ ￿ i.e., (3.8) holds ￿ and:
Q(s(￿);￿)Sp ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Sp + ￿; (4.2)
implying that the boss￿expected sanction in the deviation exceeds the utility from self-reporting.18
We shall look for a cuto⁄ equilibrium where in some states neither the agent nor the boss talk,
in some other states only the agent whistles, while in the rest of the states the boss self-reports. In
order to describe such equilibrium two relevant thresholds need to be characterized: (i) ￿ > 0 below
which no agent is admitted into the program (precisely as before), and (ii) ￿(￿) above which the boss
self-reports.
Given a policy }￿=(L;￿;￿) and a state ￿ > ￿, the boss decides to self-report if and only if
inequality (4.2) holds. Consider any incentive compatible policy specifying a disclosure rule s(￿), such
that s(￿) ￿ ￿ and _ s(￿) ￿ 0. Denote by ￿(￿) the solution with respect to ￿ of (4.2) taken as an
equality, then in all states above this cuto⁄ ￿ i.e., ￿ ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ the boss gains from self-reporting.
17In Italy, for instance, the earliest whistleblowers were simple soldiers, even Buscetta (the ￿rst important ￿ pentito￿ )
never reached the status of leader within the organization, it was only a few years after the introduction of the accomplice-
witnesses program that the ￿rst important bosses started their cooperation ￿ e.g., Giovanni Brusca and Giuseppe Di
Cristina in Sicily, Carmine Al￿eri and Domenico Bidognetti in Campania and Francesco Fonti in Calabria (Falcone,
1991).
18Also in this case we assume that the boss self-reports whenever indi⁄erent between cooperating and facing the
uncertainty of the trial.
15Of course, if ￿ is large enough, the boss never self-reports and the optimal policy is the same as
that characterized in the baseline model.19 This applies, for instance, to organizations such as the
￿ Ndrangheta, where leadership is inherited on a ￿ blood relationship￿basis. However, the Ma￿a and
the Camorra feature a di⁄erent pattern: command positions in these organizations do not necessarily
follow the bloodline and are usually the outcome of interior ￿ghts. Hence, to make the problem
interesting for our purpose, from now on we will impose the following assumption:
A5 The cost of self-reporting ￿ is such that the boss self-reports at least in some states:
Q(￿;￿)Sp > ￿: (4.3)
Intuitively, A5 implies that for ￿ su¢ ciently close to 1 the boss is going to self-report in state ￿
and in its neighborhood.20 Finally, to guarantee uniqueness of the optimal policy we also make the
next additional technical requirement:
A6 The function Q(￿;￿) is strictly concave in ￿ and satis￿es the Inada condition Q￿ (0;0) = +1.21
Assuming that, when the agent tells the truth, the conviction probability Q(￿;￿)exhibits ￿ decreas-
ing marginal returns￿seems a mild and reasonable requirement.
We now begin the analysis with the following preliminary result.
Lemma 1. Assume A4-A5. For any disclosure rule s(￿), such that (i) 0 ￿ s(￿) ￿ ￿, (ii) s(0) = 0
and s(￿) = ￿, and (iii) _ s(￿) ￿ 0, there exits an upper-bound ￿ < 1 and a lower-bound ￿ < ￿ such
that:
￿ for all ￿ < ￿ the boss never self-reports;
￿ for all ￿ > ￿ the boss always self-reports;
￿ for every ￿ 2 (￿;￿) there exists a cuto⁄ ￿(￿) > 0 such that the boss self-reports for ￿ ￿ ￿(￿),
while he does not talk for ￿ < ￿(￿):
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Under A5 a too generous amnesty ￿ i.e., ￿ larger
than ￿ ￿ leads the boss to plea guilty and cheat his fellow, while a too restrictive policy ￿ i.e., ￿
smaller than ￿ ￿ discourages self-reporting. For intermediate values of ￿ there is a non-empty region
of ￿ where the boss does not self-report, while in the complementary region he self-reports.
First-best policy: Let us brie￿ y illustrate the ￿rst-best policy with self-reporting.
19Suppose that there exists some exogenous limit ￿ ￿ > 0 to the amnesty that can be granted to the self-reporting






￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1
￿￿
Sp:
20Of course, this is only a su¢ cient condition and is made only for simplicity. More generally, for any given ￿, there
exists a ￿ su¢ ciently large such that the equivalent of (4.3) holds.
21The Inada condition above allows to safely focus on interior solutions, and can be easily relaxed by Q￿ (0;0) =
K with K ￿nite but large enough.
16Proposition 3. Assume A1-A6. The ￿rst-best policy }
fb
￿ features the same properties as in Propo-
sition 1 ￿ i.e., no rationing and full disclosure. Moreover, the boss self-reports for all ￿ ￿ ￿(￿fb),
where ￿(￿fb) and ￿fb 2 (0;1) solve:












where 0 < ￿(￿fb) < ￿; so that the agent whistles only if ￿ ￿ ￿(￿fb).
Hence, allowing the boss to self-report is socially bene￿cial even under complete information.
However, this is for reasons that are completely di⁄erent from those emphasized in Kaplow and Shavell
(1994). In their model self-reporting is unambiguously good for welfare since it saves enforcement
resources (individuals who report their harmful acts need not be detected) and reduces risk (self-
reporting criminals bear certain rather than uncertain sanctions). In our hierarchical set-up, instead,
self-reporting entails bene￿ts but also costs. First, when the boss self-reports, the agent is convicted
with certainty. This re￿ ects a vertical externality, hereafter domino e⁄ect, that spurs the agent￿ s
conviction risk and translates onto a higher reservation wage that, in turn, reduces the crime rate.22
Second, the simple fact that in all states larger than ￿(￿fb) the self-reporting boss enjoys a lighter
sanction, weakens deterrence, and therefore reduces welfare by increasing the crime rate: a crime
enhancing e⁄ect.
Second-best policy: We can now turn to study the case of asymmetric information where the choice
of the boss￿amnesty will be also a⁄ected by the rent that the agent obtains in equilibrium. As a
￿rst step we de￿ne the set of incentive feasible allocations. It is easy to verify that the participation,
rationing and (local) incentive compatibility constraints are as before.
We assume and verify ex post that ￿ > ￿(￿) > ￿, where as before ￿(￿) solves (4.2) taken as an
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SadF (￿) = 0;
22This domino e⁄ect echoes Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2005).




(q (￿)Sp ￿ u0)dF (￿) +
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(Sa + (1 ￿ ￿)Sp + ￿)dF (￿):





￿; s(:); u(:); ￿
Pr(￿ ￿ ￿ (}￿))
s.t.,
(3.7), (3.8), (3.10), (3.11).
Neglecting (3.7) and (3.11), which will be veri￿ed ex-post, inserting (3.10) into the maximand and
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Z ￿
￿(￿)












The next proposition characterizes the solution of this program and de￿nes the second-best policy:
Proposition 4. Assume A1-A6. There exists a PBE of the game with self-reporting such that ￿ >
￿(￿sb) > ￿sb
￿ > 0 and:
￿ for ￿ < ￿sb
￿ the boss does not self-report and there is no leniency for the agent;
￿ for ￿ 2 [￿sb
￿;￿(￿sb)] the agent whistles but the boss does not self-report;
￿ for ￿ > ￿(￿sb) the boss-self reports.
This equilibrium behavior is supported by a policy }sb
￿ with the following properties:
￿ (Rationing) The cuto⁄ ￿sb














￿ (Partial disclosure) For ￿ 2 [￿sb
￿;￿(￿sb)] an agent who whistles is required to deliver a
testimony ssb
￿ (￿) solving the following ￿rst-order condition:
Qs(ssb
￿ (￿);￿)Sp ￿ Qs￿(ssb
￿ (￿);￿)




￿ (￿) ￿ ￿; with equality only at ￿ = ￿(￿sb); and _ ssb
￿ (￿) > 0. For ￿ ￿ ￿(￿sb), the policy
entails a disclosure rule ssb
￿(￿) = ￿ and an amnesty equal to ￿sb
￿(￿(￿sb)).
￿ (Excessive self-reporting) The cuto⁄ ￿(￿sb) and the discount ￿sb solve:






















￿ < ￿(￿sb) < ￿(￿fb) < ￿ and ￿sb > ￿fb.
￿ (Excessive amnesty) The amnesty ￿sb




￿ (￿). Moreover, for ￿ 2 [￿sb
￿; ￿(￿sb)], the second-best amnesty with self-reporting is:
￿sb
￿ (￿) = 1 ￿ p + (1 ￿ Q(ssb
￿(￿);￿))
1
















￿ (￿) < 0 and _ Bsb
￿ (￿) > 0. While ￿sb
￿ (￿) = ￿sb
￿(￿(￿sb)) for ￿ ￿ ￿(￿sb).
There is one novel force shaping the second best amnesty ￿sb in addition to the domino and the
crime enhancing e⁄ects emphasized in Proposition 3. Essentially, granting an amnesty to the self-
reporting boss has a bene￿cial rent saving e⁄ect that goes through the incentive constraints. The
logic is similar to that explaining the rationing result. An higher amnesty ￿ expands the subset of
states where the boss self-reports, this diminishes the measure of agents admitted into the program,
which in turn makes mimicking less pro￿table. This rent-reduction e⁄ect reinforces the domino e⁄ect,
whereby leading the boss to self-report more often than in the complete information case. The second-
best policy under self-reporting also di⁄ers from the policy characterized in Proposition 2. This is
because asymmetric information introduces mimicking opportunities that lead the Legislator to require
biased testimonies, and these distortions are positively linked with the measure of agents that whistle
in equilibrium. Hence, granting an amnesty to the self-reporting boss allows to mitigate the basic
rent-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄:
Corollary 1. Assume A1-A7. Then ssb
￿ (￿) > ssb (￿) for all ￿ 2 [￿sb
￿;￿(￿sb)] and ￿sb
￿ < ￿sb. The e⁄ect
of self-reporting on the amnesty is ambiguous.
When the boss can self-report there is less need to distort the agent￿ s testimony simply because
in equilibrium there will be a lower fraction of agents that whistle. This e⁄ect is formally captured
by the modi￿ed distortion in equation (4.7). Hence, the Legislator needs to waste less rents to elicit
truthful information revelation, and this allows to request more precise testimonies. Precisely the
same reasoning can also explain why self-reporting also implies less need for rationing.
19The reason why the e⁄ect of self-reporting on the amnesty is ambiguous is due to the presence
of two countervailing e⁄ects. On the one hand, the amnesty granted to the agent when the boss is
allowed to self-report increases because of both better testimonies (higher s) and less rationing (lower
￿). On the other hand, however, better testimonies also reduce the retaliation risk faced by an agent
entering the program, which in turn decreases the need for compensating this higher risk.
5. Concluding Remarks
The use of insider information in criminal proceeding is widely recognized as one of the main pillars
of the ￿ modern￿￿ght against organized crime. Nevertheless, the implementation of these rules is
often undermined by ethical and political concerns. This skepticism calls for a better theoretical
understanding of the right responses of the judicial and legal system to the growing organizational
complexity and economic in￿ uence of criminal groups. Keeping this goal in mind, in this paper we have
studied the problem of a policy maker designing immunity for privately informed accomplice-witnesses.
We focused on a hierarchical criminal organization to capture the basic trade-o⁄s emerging when the
e¢ cacy of an accomplice-witnesses program is undermined by an asymmetry of information between
the judicial system and its actors, and criminals willing to testify against their partners in exchange of
lighter sanctions. We have identi￿ed the main economic forces that may induce informants to release
distorted testimonies and, building on the interplay between these e⁄ects, we have characterized the
second-best policy preventing untruthful information revelation. Our conclusions are consistent with a
number of widespread legislative provisions requiring that accomplices must ful￿ll minimal information
requirements to be admitted into the program and that a bonus should be granted to those who provide
more valuable information. These insights have been extended to the case where the privilege of an
amnesty is also awarded to a self-reporting boss.
206. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Di⁄erentiating the objective function of the ￿rst-best program with respect






= (Q(￿fb;￿fb) ￿ q(￿fb))Sp:
Under A1 these equations immediately imply sfb (￿) = ￿ and ￿fb = 0 ￿ i.e., full disclosure and
no rationing. Moreover, the Legislator will induce agents to apply to the program by granting the
reservation amnesty ￿(:) that satis￿es the participation constraint as equality ￿ i.e.,
(1 ￿ ￿fb (￿))Sa + (1 ￿ Q(￿;￿)) = pSa 8￿ 2 ￿: ￿
Incentive feasible allocations: The characterization of the incentive compatibility constraints is
standard, see for instance La⁄ont and Martimort (2002, Ch., 3). Equation (3.6) is standard, while (3.7)
comes from the usual total di⁄erentiation technique which implies u^ ￿^ ￿ (￿;￿) ￿ 0 and thus u^ ￿￿ (￿;￿) ￿ 0.
Finally, the expression for _ u(￿) follows immediately from (3.6) together with an application of the
Envelope Theorem. Note that A1 implies that this rent is positive. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: Optimizing pointwisely the objective function in P with respect to s(￿)
one gets immediately the ￿rst-order condition (3.13), which directly implies ssb (￿) ￿ ￿ for all ￿ with
equality only at ￿ by A1. Moreover, optimizing with respect to ￿ one has the ￿rst-order condition
(3.12). Given the pair (ssb (￿);￿sb), the second-best amnesty schedule ￿sb (￿) has to satisfy two
requirements: (i) it has to ensure that the agent￿ s incentive compatibility constraint is met ￿ i.e.,
it must satisfy (3.6)evaluated at ssb (￿); (ii) it must be such that the cuto⁄ type ￿sb is indi⁄erent
between entering the program and facing the trial ￿ i.e., u(￿sb) = u0. From (3.10) one has:




using u0 = ￿pSa:









which immediately implies (ii). Next, di⁄erentiating with resepct to ￿ we have:
_ ￿
sb
(￿)Sa = ￿Qs(ssb (￿);￿))_ ssb (￿);
which directly implies (i) and that _ ￿
sb
(￿) < 0 provided that _ ssb (￿) > 0 (which is shown below).
Moreover, ￿sb (￿) > ￿fb (￿) for all ￿ ￿ ￿sb follows from the fact that Q(:) is concave in s and has a
maximum at s = ￿:












21Finally, the fact that Bsb (￿) ￿ 0 is immediate, while
_ Bsb (￿) = Q￿(ssb (x);x) > 0:
We now prove that the ￿rst-order necessary conditions (3.12) and (3.13) are also su¢ cient for an
optimum by showing that the objective of the Legislator￿ s relaxed program P is strictly concave under
A1-A3. To begin with, observe that for any given ￿ the objective of P (hereafter W (:) with a little
abuse of notation) is strictly concave in s(:) ￿ i.e.,
@2W (:)
@s(:)
2 = Qss(ssb (￿);￿)Sp ￿ Qss￿(ssb (￿);￿)
1 ￿ F (￿)
f (￿)
< 0:
Di⁄erentiating twice with respect to ￿ the objective W (:) evaluated at the disclosure rule ssb (￿) that




￿Q￿ (:) ￿ _ ssb (:)
￿
Qs (:)Sp ￿ Q￿s (:)










































Assumption A2 then implies that
@2W(:)
@￿2 < 0 since Q￿ (:) > 0 and Q￿￿ (:) ￿ 0. Moreover, in order to
show that ￿sb is in the interior of ￿, observe that, under A1, the left-hand side of (3.12) is positive,
increasing and nil at ￿ = 0. In order to establish the optimality of setting a ￿ oor ￿sb 2 (0;￿) it is then

















, and (iii) ￿(￿) is con-
tinuous. Showing that ￿(0) > 0 is immediate since
1￿F(0)
f(0) = 1=f (0) > 0. Moreover, showing that
￿(￿) < Q(￿;￿) ￿ q(￿) is simple since
1￿F(￿)
f(￿) = 0 implies ssb(￿) = ￿ from (3.13). Continuity of ￿(￿)
follows from the hypothesis that the functions Q(:), q (:) and F (:) are twice continuously di⁄erentiable.
Finally, to conclude the proof we have to verify that the policy characterized by (3.12), (3.13)
and (3.14) satis￿es the second-order local incentive compatibility constraint (3.7), the global incentive
compatibility constraint and the rationing constraint (3.11).
We ￿rst show that (3.7) is met under A1-A3. Since Qs￿ (:) > 0 by A1, we only need to show that
22_ ssb (￿) ￿ 0. This is straightforward, using (3.13) the Implicit Function Theorem implies:
















where A2 and A3 imply _ ssb (￿) > 0.
Second, in order to show that the global incentive compatibility constraint holds we need to verify









which by de￿nition of u(￿0;￿) implies:
(1 ￿ ￿sb(￿0))Sa + (1 ￿ Q(ssb(￿0);￿)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿sb(￿))Sa + (1 ￿ Q(ssb (￿);￿)): (A1)







(x)Sa + _ ssb (x)Qs(ssb (x);￿)
o
dx ￿ 0;
using (3.6) and substituting for _ ￿
sb


















which immediately implies the result since _ ssb(x) ￿ 0, x ￿ ￿ and Qs￿ (:) ￿ 0.
Showing that no type ￿ ￿ ￿sb can pro￿t by mimicking a type ￿0 < ￿sb is obvious given the fact that
_ u(￿) > 0. Finally, we show that the rationing constraint is satis￿ed ￿ i.e., there is no state ￿ < ￿sb
where the agent can pro￿t by announcing ￿0 ￿ ￿sb. Formally:
u0 = ￿pSa ￿ u(￿0;￿) 8￿ < ￿sb and 8￿0 ￿ ￿sb: (A3)
First, observe that by de￿nition of the marginal type ￿sb equation (A3) can be rewritten as:
u(￿sb) ￿ u(￿0;￿); (A4)
moreover, since Q￿ (:) > 0 and ￿sb > ￿ it must be u(￿0;￿sb) > u(￿0;￿). Inequality (A4) must then hold
as long as the following is true:
u(￿sb) ￿ u(￿0;￿sb) 8￿0 > ￿sb;
which is true precisely by the same argument used to show that the global incentive compatibility
constraint holds for all types
￿
￿;￿0￿
2 [￿sb;￿)2: This concludes the proof. ￿
23Proof of Lemma 1: Take any continuously di⁄erentiable disclosure rule s(￿) such that: (i) s(￿) ￿ ￿;
(ii) s(￿) = ￿ and s(0) = 0, (iii) _ s(￿) ￿ 0. Then, for given s(￿), let ￿(￿) be the solution with respect
to ￿ of:
Q(s(￿);￿)Sp = (1 ￿ ￿)Sp + ￿: (A5)
By assumption ￿(￿) exists for some ￿ > 0 because Q(s(￿);￿) is increasing in ￿. Moreover, ￿(￿)





Qs (s(￿);￿) _ s(￿) + Q￿ (s(￿);￿)
< 0.
We then need to show that there exists a ￿ 2 (0;1) such that ￿(￿) 2 (0;￿). This simply follows
from the fact that at ￿ = 1 one has ￿(￿) < ￿ by A5 ￿ i.e., the boss self-reports for ￿ large enough.
Moreover, A4 implies that at ￿ = 1 equation (A5) cannot hold for ￿ close to 0 and therefore the boss
does not self-report in these states. Hence, ￿(￿) > 0. By continuity, this implies that there must exist
a non-empty open set (￿;￿) such that ￿(￿) 2 (0;￿) for all ￿ < ￿ < ￿. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3: To begin with, note that in an equilibrium where the boss self-reports ￿
i.e., ￿(￿) < ￿ ￿ and the agent whistles but is rationed in some states ￿ i.e., 0 < ￿ < ￿(￿) ￿ the





(q (￿)Sp ￿ u0)dF (￿) +
Z ￿
￿(￿)




(Q(s(￿);￿)Sp + pSa)dF (￿)
)
:
Di⁄erentiating the above objective function with respect to s(:) and ￿ it is immediate to show
that, in an interior solution, the ￿rst-best policy with self-reporting features full disclosure and no
rationing ￿ i.e., s
fb
￿ (￿) = ￿ for all ￿ and ￿
fb
￿ = 0. Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿ one obtains the
￿rst-order condition:










(Q(￿(￿fb);￿(￿fb))Sp + pSa) = 0:
Using the fact that if ￿(￿fb) 2int￿ then (4.4) must hold by de￿nition ￿ i.e.,
Q(￿(￿fb);￿(￿fb))Sp = (1 ￿ ￿fb)Sp + ￿:







The ￿rst-order condition above then boils down to (4.5).





hence ￿(￿fb) < ￿. Moreover, to show that ￿(￿fb) > 0 note that for ￿(￿fb) = 0 equation (4.5) together







Uniqueness of the optimal policy follows from the fact that under A6 the left hand side of (4.5)
is decreasing in ￿ and
@￿(￿fb)
@￿ < 0, while A2 together with
@￿(￿fb)
@￿ < 0 imply that the right hand side
of (4.5) is decreasing in ￿. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: Di⁄erentiating the objective function of P￿ with respect to ￿ and s(:)
yields immediately the ￿rst-order conditions (4.6) and (4.7). Using the same techniques developed in
the proof of Proposition 2 it follows immediately that: (i) ￿sb
￿ 2int￿, (ii) ssb
￿ (￿) ￿ ￿ with equality
only at ￿ = ￿(￿sb) and _ ssb
￿ (￿) ￿ 0, and (iii) that (4.10) yields the agent￿ s state contingent amnesty.
Next, we must show that (4.9) identi￿es the optimal amnesty for the self-reporting boss, and that
￿sb




























Using the fact that when ￿(￿sb) 2int￿ condition (4.8) must hold by de￿nition ￿ i.e.,
Q(￿(￿sb);￿(￿sb))Sp = (1 ￿ ￿sb)Sp + ￿;















￿ (￿);￿)d￿ = 0: (A6)




) = ￿(￿sb) by (4.7), which by A1 implies







Implying that the ￿rst-order condition (A6) rewrites as:















Now, to show that ￿(￿sb) < ￿ note that for ￿(￿sb) = ￿ the ￿rst-order condition (A8) yields:







hence ￿(￿sb) < ￿. We then need to show that ￿(￿sb) > ￿sb













Substituting ￿(￿sb) = ￿sb
￿ into the ￿rst-order condition (3.12) one has ￿sb
￿ = 0. Then A6 implies
that (A9) cannot hold, and therefore ￿(￿sb) 6= ￿sb
￿. Second, showing that ￿(￿sb) < ￿sb
￿ follows from
a revealed preference argument. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium where only the boss self-
reports, and denote by ^ ￿sb the optimal amnesty such that 0 < ￿(^ ￿sb) < ^ ￿
sb
￿. Then in such equilibrium
there will be a subset of states of nature where the trial takes place ￿ i.e., for all ￿ 2 [0;￿(^ ￿sb)). But,
for any given ￿(^ ￿sb), Proposition 2 implies that the Legislator can strictly reduce the crime rate by
letting the agent talk in some states ￿ < ￿(^ ￿sb) ￿ i.e.,
Z ￿(^ ￿sb)
0









Q(s(￿);￿)Sp ￿ u0 ￿ Q￿ (s(￿);￿)






It then follows that ￿(￿sb) > ￿sb
￿ and that (4.9) is a necessary condition to identify an internal optimum.
Finally, we show that ￿(￿sb) < ￿(￿fb), and therefore ￿sb > ￿fb. In doing so let us rewrite the
￿rst-order necessary conditions identifying ￿fb and ￿sb respectively, as:














Note that the left-hand side of (A11) is larger than the left-hand side of (A10) because ￿(￿sb) > ￿sb
￿
and Q￿ (:) > 0. Moreover, note that for any given ￿ under A2 the right-hand of both equations is









Hence, ￿(￿sb) < ￿(￿fb) and ￿sb > ￿fb. Finally, showing that ￿sb
￿ (￿) > ￿
fb
￿ (￿) for all ￿ ￿ ￿sb
￿ and
that the ￿rst-order necessary conditions (4.6)-(4.9) are also su¢ cient for an optimum follows the same
arguments used in the proof of Proposition 2.
In order to complete the proof we must verify that, given the policy described in the statement of
the proposition, neither the agent nor the boss can pro￿tably deviate from the equilibrium where the
26agent talks in states ￿ < ￿(￿sb) and the boss self-reports only if ￿ ￿ ￿(￿sb).
Consider ￿rst the boss. Showing that he cannot gain by self-reporting in states ￿ < ￿(￿sb) is
straightforward and it immediately follows from equation (4.8) and A1. Next, suppose that he does
not talk in a state ￿ > ￿(￿sb), we must show that in this ￿ o⁄equilibrium￿history the following happens:
(i) the agent will cooperate and, (ii) his testimony is such that the boss￿deviation is not pro￿table.





. Suppose for now that such
allocation is incentive compatible, that is ^ ￿ = ￿for all ￿ ￿ ￿(￿sb) (a conjecture that will be checked ex
post). By construction the boss will not ￿nd it pro￿table to deviate because under A1 the following
is true:
Q(￿;￿)Sp > (1 ￿ ￿sb)Sp + ￿ 8￿ > ￿(￿sb).





is indeed incentive compatible for type
￿ > ￿(￿sb) provided that the boss has (unexpectedly) not self-reported. To do so, we need to check that
the agent cannot pro￿tably deviate neither from mimicking a type ^ ￿ > ￿(￿sb) nor a type ^ ￿ < ￿(￿sb).
Given the ￿ o⁄-equilibrium￿policy (~ s(^ ￿); ~ ￿), it is immediate to show that mimicking a type ^ ￿ > ￿(￿sb) is
not convenient because both the ￿rst- and second-order local incentive constraints are satis￿ed (which
by standard arguments also implies that the global incentive constraint holds). Suppose now that the
agent lies by claiming that the state is ^ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿sb), his utility would then be:
u(^ ￿;￿) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿sb







￿(^ ￿)Sa + Qs(ssb
￿(^ ￿);￿)_ ssb
￿(^ ￿):
Note that Qs￿ (:) > 0 and _ ssb
￿(^ ￿) > 0 together with the local incentive constraint (3.6) yield:
_ ￿
sb
￿(^ ￿)Sa + Qs(ssb
￿(^ ￿);￿)_ ssb
￿(^ ￿) > _ ￿
sb
￿(^ ￿)Sa + Qs(ssb
￿(^ ￿);^ ￿)_ ssb






￿(^ ￿)Sa + Qs(ssb
￿(^ ￿);￿)_ ssb
￿(^ ￿) > 0 8^ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿sb) < ￿:
This implies that if the agent mimics in state ￿ > ￿(￿sb) by pretending that the state is ^ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿sb)
he will always pretend to be in state ￿(￿sb) ￿ i.e., where the information rent that he gets by reporting
a state ￿0 ￿ ￿(￿sb) is maximal. But then, he could do strictly better from telling the truth and obtain





. This can be easily veri￿ed by using equation (A12). In
fact, in this case the agent￿ s expected utility would be:
~ u(￿) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿sb
￿(￿(￿sb)))Sa ￿ (1 ￿ Q(￿;￿));
which immediately yields
~ u(￿) > u(￿(￿sb);￿) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿sb
￿(￿(￿sb)))Sa ￿ (1 ￿ Q(￿(￿sb);￿));
since ￿ > ￿(￿sb). It then follows that, given the policy described in the statement of the proposition,
in an ￿ o⁄-equilibrium￿history where the boss has not self-reported in state ￿ > ￿(￿sb) the agent
27truthfully reveals his type. Hence, the boss￿expected sanction in this continuation game would be
Q(￿;￿)Sp; which is clearly above the costs from self-reporting (1 ￿ ￿sb)Sp + ￿ by (4.8) and A1.
We are left to show that no agent can pro￿tably deviate when the boss self-reports. But this
is trivial as in this case they are convicted with certainty and their information is worthless to the
prosecutor. Finally, showing that the rationing and global incentive constraints hold for all types
￿ 2 [￿sb;￿(￿sb)) follows exactly the same steps as those developed in the proof of Proposition 2. ￿
Proof of Corollary 1: Showing that ssb
￿ (￿) > ssb (￿) for all ￿ 2 [￿sb
￿;￿(￿sb)] follows immediately
from comparing equation (3.13) with (4.7) and F(￿(￿sb)) < 1 since ￿(￿sb) < ￿ ￿. To show that ￿sb
￿ < ￿sb
consider equations (3.12) and (4.6). Note that ￿sb
































￿;￿) > 0 by concavity of the objective function with respect to ￿ and
@￿(￿sb)
@￿ < 0 by (A7).
Hence, it follows that
@￿sb
￿
@￿ < 0 implying immediately that ￿sb
￿ < ￿sb. ￿
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